I Introduction
While it is recognized that in ‡ation has distortionnary e¤ects, how these distortions in‡uence the labor market remains an open question. In particular, the persistence of unemployment at huge levels in some countries raises the issue of how monetary policy should be conducted to reduce unemployment, if it can. A …rst step is to address whether higher in ‡ation has a long-run e¤ect on unemployment: is the long-run Phillips curve vertical, as advocated by Friedman (1968) , or do we have good reasons to believe that higher in ‡ation in ‡uences the level of structural unemployment, and if the answer is positive, in which direction?
To investigate this issue, I extend a discrete-time version of the labor matching model of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) , and Pissarides (2000) (Henceforth MP). Jobs are created by the matching of unemployed workers and vacancies. This process is timeconsuming and represented by a well-behaved matching function. Firms open vacancies until a free-entry condition is met. Workers and …rms Nash bargain over wages. The departure from the MP setting is the introduction of frictions in the product market that makes …at money necessary as a medium of exchange. For this purpose, I assume that the economy is composed of distinct goods, produced by distinct agents on separate islands.
These goods are non storable, non transportable and are not consumed by their producers.
These additional assumptions generate a double coincidence problem that gives money an essential role to play.
In this setting, a higher in ‡ation rate induces a higher depreciation of money holdings trough an in ‡ation tax mechanism. When in ‡ation increases, a given amount of income at a given period enables to consume a lower amount of goods in the following period. Thus, the returns of economic activities are reduced, while search cost are not a¤ected. Firms therefore post fewer vacancies and unemployment is eventually larger at the steady state.
Hence, the long-run Phillips curve is upwards slopping in the in ‡ation-unemployment space.
I then characterize what is the optimal monetary policy. In particular, I investigate whether or not the so-called Friedman rule (according to which prices de ‡ate at a rate that makes the real return of money equal to the discount rate) is optimal. A departure from the Friedman rule is optimal if and only if employment is ine¢ ciently high at the Friedman rule. It happens when workers'bargaining power is low compared to the Hosios (1990) condition, or when the labor market policies are too employment-friendly. In this retrospect, the optimal monetary policy is an explicit function of the labor market institutions and policies. The more employment-friendly are labor market policies, the higher the optimal in ‡ation rate. Theoretical approaches di¤er on how money is introduced and how the labor market works. Pissarides (1990, pp. 31-40) introduces a "dynamic IS-LM" structure à la Tobin (1965) in his MP model. At the steady-state, a rise in the monetary growth rate decreases the real interest rate and increases the in ‡ation rate and the nominal interest. The former e¤ect speeds up job creation, thereby decreasing the equilibrium unemployment rate.
His consumption and money demand functions are exogenous reduced forms and lack micro-foundations. Cooley and Hansen (1989) and Quadrini (1999 and introduce money through an explicit cash-in-advance assumption. In Cooley and Hansen (1999) labor supply is reduced when in ‡ation is increased through a consumption-leisure substitution mechanism. Conversely, the labor market in Cooley Quadrini (1999 Quadrini ( , 2004 follows the MP setting. Cooley and Quadrini add a second production factor, namely In my model, labor is the sole production factor, and the key mechanism is a consumption / search trade o¤. I further introduce unemployment insurance and labor payroll tax.
This second departure enables me to consider how the optimal monetary policy should 3 adjust to labor market policies, and how far the in ‡ation tax is similar to a tax on labor. The paper is organized as follows. The environment is described in the next section, while economic behaviors are solved in section III. The equilibrium is resolved in Section IV and optimal policies are described in Section V. The last section concludes.
II The Economy
The economy is made of n 3 symmetric "islands"indexed by j 2 f1; :::; ng 1 . An island is characterized by a speci…c consumption good that requires speci…c skills to be produced.
In each island, there is a mass of type j entrepreneurs (henceforth type j …rms) and a mass of 1=n type j workers. These workers are either employed or unemployed. Type j employed workers can only produce type j good. Type j …rms can only hire type j workers and be located in the j th island. There is also a government that gives unemployment bene…ts to unemployed workers and a lump-sum transfer to employed and unemployed workers. The government raises revenues from tax on labor and from money creation.
Time is discrete and indexed by t 2 N. The discount rate is r > 0. Each period (day) is divided into a labor market sub-period (the morning) and a product market sub-period (the afternoon). Matching process, wage bargaining and production take place in the morning, as in the MP setting. Trade in the product market, consumption and monetary transfers occur in the afternoon under perfect walrasian competition. The timing is displayed in I describe now the speci…c assumptions I impose to give money an essential role to play. 
II.1 Labor market sub-period
Following Figure 1 , the labor market subperiod is divided in three consecutive steps: job creation and destruction, wage bargaining, and production.
II.1.1 Job creation and job destruction
Jobs are exogenously destroyed according to probability s 2 (0; 1), so s is also the fraction of preexisting jobs that are dissolved. Job creation is the outcome of a time-consuming matching process. Following MP, this process is represented by a matching function. Let j u t 1 and j t 1 be respectively the number of unemployment workers and vacancies in island j at the end of the period t 1 (therefore, at the very beginning of period t). The matching function M ( j u t 1 ; j t 1 ) gives the number of newly created jobs in island j. The total mass of employed and unemployed type j workers is 1=n, so employment in island j is 1=n j u t , and the mass of job destroyed is s (1=n j u t ). Therefore, unemployment in island j evolves according to:
The matching function M (u; ) is identical across islands and time periods. Following the literature surveyed in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) , I assume that the matching function exhibits constant returns to scale, is continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave in both arguments. Unemployment and vacancies are necessary for job creation so:
Finally, in the current discrete-time setting, the number of newly jobs is lower than the mass of vacancies and of unemployment. Therefore:
Let j t 1 = j t 1 = j u t 1 be the tightness of the j th labor market at the end of period t 1. The job-…lling probability for a vacancy to match with an unemployed worker is a function of tightness only:
. Symmetrically, the job …nding probability of an unemployed worker is a function of tightness:
. From the assumptions above, one has for any 2 (0; +1) :
Finally, I denote (:) the elasticity of the job …lling probability in absolute terms.
Therefore, ( ) 2 (0; 1) and
II.1.2 Wage bargaining
At each period, the worker and the …rm Nash bargain over the nominal wage. This wage is negotiated in the morning but will only be paid in the afternoon once the production will be sold. The assumption that workers are paid after the production is consistent with reality where salaries for a given month are paid at the end of the month.
The negotiated wage may a priori depend on the …rm and on the worker's money holdings. To rule out such possibility, I assume that an individual's level of money holding is private information and cannot be credibly communicated. Hence, the wage is islandspeci…c and not match-speci…c. I denote j W t the wage in island j. In the absence of money illusion, only the real wage matters. I denote j w t = j W t = j+1 p t the real wage on the j th island where the de ‡ator is the price j+1 p t of the relevant consumption good.
Since bargaining occurs at the plant level, the …rm and the worker take the macroeconomic environment as given, and in particular the payroll tax rate and the lump-sum transfer (denoted T t in real terms) that is given to employed and unemployed workers.
II.1.3 Production
Once an agreement is reached, production takes place. Each …lled job produces y > 0 units of goods.
II.2 The product market
Following Figure 1 , the product market subperiod is divided in three consecutive steps:
trade, consumption, and monetary transfers.
II.2.1 Trade
There is a walrasian auctioneer in each island that sells the production of local …rms. Type j workers and type j entrepreneurs move to island j + 1. They choose how to split the money they hold at the beginning of the current period m t between consumption c t of good j + 1 and money hoarding b m t . The j + 1 th auctioneer sets the price j+1 p t to clear the product market on the j + 1 th island. Since employment in island j + 1 is (1=n j+1 u t ) and each …lled job produces y units of good at each period, the product market-clearing condition on island j + 1 writes:
where j M t is the total amount of money hold by type j individuals at the beginning of period t and j c M t is the total amount of money hoarded by the same individuals at the end of the trade subperiod before receiving monetary transfers.
II.2.2 Consumption
Once individuals have bought the amount of good they desire, they consume. A type 
II.2.3 Monetary transfers
Once type j individuals have consumed type j +1 goods in island j +1, they get back to the j th island. The j th auctioneer then gives to …rms their money receipts from sales. Firms then pay their employees. Employed workers in turn pay their tax to the government.
The government creates or destroys money, so the aggregate money stock becomes M t+1 instead of M t . Money creation (destruction) generates income (expenditures) for the government in terms of seigniorage. With these revenues, the government pays transfers to every workers and unemployment bene…ts to unemployed workers. Let T t and z be respectively the real values of unconditional transfers and unemployment bene…ts.
Since islands are symmetric and of equal size, I henceforth drop index j. Let u t be the total mass of unemployed workers, the government's budget constraint writes:
I choose an in ‡ation pegging speci…cation of the monetary policy. Instead of de…ning the monetary policy through the in ‡ation rate, it is equivalent and more convenient (as it will shortly appear) to characterize it through:
To interpret i, imagine there were a perfect bound market in this economy, the equilibrium real interest rate would then be equal to the discount rate r and the corresponding nominal interest rate would be i. Because preferences over consumption are linear, agents would be able to substitute current for future consumption perfectly, and any other level of the interest rate would not clear the bound market. In this retrospect, Equation (6) plays the role of a Fisher equation with a constant real interest rate.
The speci…c unemployment bene…ts z, the payroll tax rate and i (equivalently the in ‡ation rate) are the exogenous policy parameters. The money stock M t and the lump sum T t are endogenous variables that clears the budget constraint (5) and reach the target (6).
III Economic Behaviors
In this section, I derive workers' and …rms' behavior. Finally, I derive the wage setting equation.
III.1 Workers
Let V e t (m t ) and V u t (m t ) be respectively the lifetime expected utility of an employed and of an unemployed worker. These values are functions of money holdings m t at the beginning of period t. Workers decide how to split their money holdings m t between consumption c t and money hoarding b m t , such that:
Then, they receive some monetary transfers that come in addition to their money hoarding.
Each employed workers receive wage W t , transfers p t T t and pay taxes W t . Therefore, their future money holdings are
Symmetrically, unemployed workers receive unemployment bene…ts and transfers, which amount to p t (z + T t ) units of money. Therefore, they start the next period with m t+1 = b m t + p t (z + T t ). Finally, employed (unemployed) workers loose their (…nd a) job according to probability s ( q ( )). Using (7) to express consumption c as a function of money holdings m and money hoarding b m, value functions therefore solve the following Bellman equations 3 for any m t 2 R + :
where
where :
Applying the envelope theorem to (8) and (9), one gets for any m t 0 :
where V j = V j (0) for j=e;u. The …rst-order conditions of (8) and (9) with respect to money hoarding b m are:
The last equality is derived from (6) . Whenever i > 0, which I henceforth assume, programs (8) and ( At the so-called Friedman rule, prices evolve at a rate given by p t+1 =p t = 1= (1 + r) < 1, which corresponds to a negative in ‡ation (de ‡ation) rate. Under such a rule, money holdings have no cost (i = 0), and consumers are indi¤erent between consumption and money hoarding. If the in ‡ation rate is higher than the Friedman rule, one gets p t+1 =p t > 1= (1 + r) and therefore i > 0. In such case, individual wish to substitute current for 4 Programs (8) and (9) should also include a non-negativity constraint on consumption c. Given (7), this equation writes b m m. I have solved these programs assuming that the non-negativity constraint on consumption is slack. Since the solution is 0 = b m < m, one has c > 0, so one can omit constraint c 0 in the reasoning. future consumption. So, workers minimize their money holdings, and b m t = 0. With this behavior in mind, and using the linearity of the value functions, we get from (8) and (9):
These equations in the present discrete-time setting correspond to usual asset equations for employed and unemployed workers in the continuous-time version of MP (see. e.g. units of goods next period. Because of discounting, the latter is valued 1 + i times less than the former.
III.2 Firms
As workers, entrepreneurs face the consumption/money hoarding trade o¤. At the end of the afternoon, an entrepreneur who has`t employed workers receives p t y t `t units of money that corresponds to her sales and pays W t = p t w t units of money to each of her`t employees. Hence, her value function depends on her money holding m t and on her number`t of employees. At each period a fraction s of these jobs are dissolved. Each additional vacancy increases future employment by one unit with probability q ( ) but induces a disutility cost . Assuming that t and`t are "large" enough, ‡ows of newly created jobs and of destroyed jobs are deterministic 6 and respectively equal to q ( ) t and s `t. Therefore, future employment is a deterministic variable and the …rm's value function solves:
As for workers'programs (8) and (9), the envelope condition over money holdings 
The correspondence directly follows the approximation (V e t+1
Therefore, the present model is an extension of what Pissarides (2000) call the "large …rms"setting. In the case where either`t or t is too low to apply the law of large number, the program includes uncertainty for a risk-neutral agent. Hence, results are unchanged.
implies that value function is linear in m t . The …rst-order condition on money hoarding is again given by (11) and implies b m t = 0, whenever i > 0. The envelope condition over t shows that the marginal value of …lled job @V f t =@`t is independent of money holdings m t and of employment`t. Let then J t = @V f t =@L t be this marginal value. The envelope condition over L t gives:
As for workers, equation (15) is a usual asset equation for a …lled job augmented by the in ‡ation tax factor 1= (1 + i). The …rm's value function is given by:
Finally, the …rst-order condition over vacancies expresses that …rms open vacancies if and only if:
Firms open vacancies as long as the expected gain of recruiting a worker is higher than the disutility of an additional vacancy . The former equals the value of …lled job next period J t+1 times the job …lling probability q ( t ) that a current vacancy …nds an unemployed worker to hire at the beginning of the next period. For a given current number of unemployed workers u t , the current mass of vacancies t adjusts so that the current tightness in the labor market t = t =u t satis…es this free-entry condition. If there were too many (few) vacancies t , tightness t would be too high (low), the job-…lling probability q ( t ) would be too low (high), which would induce …rms to close (to open new) vacancies instantaneously. Tightness would therefore instantaneously decreases (increases) until (17) is satis…ed.
III.3 Wage Bargaining
Each worker Nash bargain with its employer over the current wage, taking as given the macroeconomic environment. For the worker (the …rm), a successful negotiation generates a surplus equal to V e t V u t (J t ). Notice from (10) and (16) that these surplus are independent of money holdings m. Let 2 (0; 1) denote the workers'bargaining power.
The negotiated wage solves the following generalized Nash product 7 :
taking V u t as given. Using (12) and (15), the …rst-order condition gives (see Appendix A):
In the absence of labor taxation (i.e. if = 0), this condition stipulates that the worker (the …rm) extracts a fraction (1 ) of the total surplus generated by a match V e t V u t + J t . When the payroll tax rate is positive > 0, a unit increase in the negotiated wage only Conversely, the in ‡ation tax does not a¤ect the sharing rule. This is because the …rm's and the workers'income are identically a¤ected by the in ‡ation tax. From the sharing rule (19) , one can derive the wage equations from (12), (13), (15) and (17)(see again Appendix A):
Wage positively depends on the utility …rms derived from production y= (1 + i), on the utility unemployed workers derived from being unemployed z= (1 + i), and on the capital gain an unemployed worker expects from …nding a job t q ( t ) V e t+1 V u t+1 (which is equal to ( = (1 )) t , given 17) and (19) . The two former terms are obtained in forms of additional money at the end of the day. They are therefore reduced when in ‡ation increases. Conversely, the latter term is proportional to the cost of posting a vacancy which is not expressed in terms of money and remains therefore una¤ected by in ‡ation.
These are the reasons why a rise in in ‡ation (thereby in the cost of money holdings i)
decreases the utility obtained from wage payment w t = (1 + i), but increases w t . Finally, as usual in MP, the negotiated wage is an increasing function of productivity y, bargaining power , payroll tax rate , unemployment bene…t z, vacancy cost and tightness in the labor market t .
IV Equilibrium
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium. The exogenous variables are the policy parameters, namely the marginal tax rate , the (speci…c) unemployment bene…ts z and the cost of money holding i. All remaining variables are endogenous. Moreover, the unemployment rate u t and the money supply M t are the only predetermined variables.
De…nition 1
Given policy parameters i, z, , and initial values of unemployment u 0 and of money supply M 0 , an equilibrium is a sequence fJ t ; V e t ; V u t ; t ; w t ; u t ; M t ; p t ; T t g t2N that satis…es:
i) The asset equations (12), (13), (15),
ii) The free-entry condition (17) iii) The wage bargaining equation (20) iv) The motion of unemployment (1) v) The product market clearing conditions (4) together with the result that for any individual b m = 0.
vi) The government's budget constraint (5).
vii) The unemployed workers receives a non-negative transfer z + T t 0.
I …rst rewrite the Bellman equation for the value of marginal job (15) in terms of tightness t thanks to the free-entry condition (17) . Using (20) to eliminate the wage w t gives:
As discussed in Blanchard and Fisher (1989, chapter 5) , this kind of non-linear and forward-looking di¤erence equation can lead to complex dynamics, including sunspots, bursting bubbles and cycles. Since the focus of this paper is on the long-run e¤ect of monetary policy, I only consider stationary equilibria where tightness is constant over time (8t, t = ). A stationary equilibrium value solves:
From (2), function F (:; ) increases in from (r + s) = (q max (1 )) to +1. Therefore, if a stationary equilibrium tightness exists, it is unique. Moreover, a stationary tightness exists only if:
A job should generate a joint surplus that is large enough at each period for …rms to post vacancies. This condition is more likely to be satis…ed if the productivity y is su¢ ciently high and if the marginal taxation on labor , the speci…c unemployment bene…ts z or the cost of money holdings i are su¢ ciently low. When condition (23) is not satis…ed, creating a job is too costly and = 0. Otherwise, the unique equilibrium tightness determines values V e , V u J and wages w, according to (12) , (13), (15) and (20) . Aggregation of (1) over islands together with q ( ) = M (u; ) =u gives:
For a given initial unemployment rate u 0 , (24) determines recursively a unique sequence of unemployment rate fu t g t2N . This sequence converges to u given by:
Any policy that raises tightness speeds up unemployed workers' entries into employment, thereby decreasing the steady-state unemployment rate u. Since individuals have no incentive to hoard money, b m = 0, aggregation of (4) across islands gives the equation of the quantity theory of Money:
Money growth is adjusted to peg an in ‡ation rate, or equivalently given equation (6), to peg a cost of money holdings i. This induces the following policy rule for the money supply:
For a given initial level of Money supply M 0 , (27) determines recursively a unique sequence of money supply fM t g t2N . In the long run, Money supply grows at the rate of in ‡ation.
Finally, at each period t the unconditional transfer T t clears the government's budget constraint (5) . An equilibrium exists only if at each period, the total transfers z + T t received by unemployed workers is non-negative.
From above, there exists at most a single stationary equilibrium. I can now derive the comparative statics. As in MP, the steady-state unemployment rate is a decreasing function of productivity y, but an increasing function of the bargaining power , the payroll tax rate , the unemployment bene…t z or the vacancy cost . The original property concerns the long-run e¤ect of monetary policy.
Proposition 1 (Long-run Phillips curve) Higher in ‡ation increases unemployment in the long-run
Proof. Given (6), a higher in ‡ation rate (p t+1 =p t ) 1 raises the cost of money holdings i. From (22) and F 0 > 0, an increase in i decreases the steady-state value of tightness .
Finally, from (25) , the steady state value of unemployment u is increased.
The intuition for this result is the following. The returns of a successful match is through additional money holdings. This is true both for the …rm through additional sales, and for employees through wages. These additional money holdings cannot be spent instantaneously at price p t , but only at price p t+1 the following period. Given discounting, the latter is valued 1+i times less than the former. An increase in the in ‡ation rate induces that monetary returns from economic activities are less valued. Conversely, the cost of posting vacancies remains unchanged. Firms thus create less vacancies, thereby reducing tightness on the labor market . Therefore, unemployment converge in the long-run to a higher steady-state level u.
Monetary policy in ‡uences unemployment in this model through an in ‡ation tax mechanism. It is therefore fruitful to compare the e¤ects of in ‡ation and the e¤ects of a payroll tax . A larger payroll tax reduces the total surplus, as does a larger in ‡ation rate. This surplus size e¤ect tends to reduce the value of a …lled job J, inducing …rms to post fewer vacancies. Additionally, a higher payroll tax reduces the worker's share of this surplus (see equation 19) , which is not the case with the in ‡ation tax. This wage moderating e¤ect attenuates the reduction of tightness. In particular, if z = 0, the wage moderating e¤ect completely o¤sets the surplus size e¤ ect, and tightness is independent of payroll tax rate 8 .
In real worlds, lump-sum transfer does not exist. However, the combination of a linear payroll tax , an unemployment bene…t z and a lump sum transfer T t , is equivalent to a non-linear tax on labor T (w) = w T t and a global unemployment bene…ts z + T t .
In this retrospect, one can interpret a positive T t as the indication that the overall tax schedule T (:) is progressive. To investigate the e¤ect of a more progressive tax schedule on equilibrium, consider the following policy departure from an equilibrium with a positive z > 0. Consider then a change in policy such that global unemployment bene…ts z + T t and monetary policy i are keep unchanged, speci…c unemployment bene…ts are nil z = 0, and the marginal tax rate is increased. According to (5) and (22) 
V Social Optimum and Optimal policies
In this section, I investigate what is the optimal monetary policy i . For this purpose, I use a Utilitarian criterion. Aggregating (10) and (16) across all workers and …rms, the social criterion is de…ned as:
In Appendix C is shown that:
Let L t = 1 u t be the aggregate employment level whose dynamics is easily obtained from (24) . The optimal allocation is therefore the solution of:
Appendix D shows that the optimal tightness solves:
where function F (:; :) has been de…ned in (22) . From (22), the equilibrium and the optimal tightness coincide if and only if F ( ; ) = y z 1 = (1 + i ). Given (30) this leads to:
We therefore get the following proposition: If i > 0, the optimal monetary policy departs from the Friedman rule and decentralizes the social optimum.
Proof. Consider the steady-state equilibrium at the Friedman Rule and let (0) be the corresponding tightness. From (22) , (30) and (31), (0) solves:
Since F 0 > 0, we can distinguish three cases:
If i = 0, one has (0) = . Implementing the Friedman rule is then optimal since it decentralizes the optimal tightness.
If i < 0, one has (0) < , so (0) is ine¢ ciently low. i = i < 0 would be optimal but is not feasible. Therefore, only a second-best is implementable and this optimum requires the Friedman rule i = 0.
If i > 0, (0) > and (0) is ine¢ ciently high. A marginal increase of in ‡ation from the Friedman rule induces a decrease in tightness, which is welfare improving.
A departure from the Friedman rule is optimal only when equilibrium tightness at the steady state is ine¢ ciently high. Then, a positive cost of money holdings decreases tightness. Total employment decreases, but total vacancies too. When tightness is ine¢ ciently high, the latter reduction dominates the former, so total welfare increases.
Employment-friendly labor market environment make a departure from the Friedman rule more likely to be optimal. Three parameters matter: the workers'bargaining power, the unemployment bene…ts and the labor payroll tax. A rise in any of these three parameters reduces the equilibrium tightness, thereby making less desirable a departure from the Friedman rule. In the absence of taxes and transfers, a departure is optimal if and only if the bargaining power is higher than the one given by the Hosios (1990) For this purpose I reconsider the policy change of the end of section IV. This change consists in a departure from an equilibrium with a positive z > 0 to an equilibrium with z = 0 and a higher T t and such that the global unemployment bene…ts z + T t is kept unchanged. As it has been shown then, such policy change corresponds to a rise in taxprogressivity that leads to a lower long-run unemployment. Hence, employment is more likely to be ine¢ ciently high at the Friedman rule and a departure from the Friedman rule is therefore more likely to be optimal.
VI Concluding remarks
In this paper, I extend the MP labor matching model by introducing frictions in the product market that makes money essential as a medium of exchange. I investigate what is the long run e¤ect of in ‡ation on unemployment. I …nd that at steady state, a higher in ‡ation rate decreases the returns of economic activity, which makes …rms more reluctant to post vacancies, thereby increasing unemployment. I then compute the optimal monetary policy. The Friedman rule is always optimal unless the workers' bargaining power, the unemployment bene…ts and the tax rate are very low or the global tax schedule is not too progressive.
The result such that a higher in ‡ation increases unemployment in the long-run may look surprising, but is based on the property that a higher cost of money holdings is a real cost, and as such, penalizes unemployment. Hence, the key issue is how monetary policy should be conducted in the long-run to decrease the cost of money holdings. In my model, a higher growth rate of money increases in ‡ation and therefore the cost of money holdings through a long-run adjustment. This logic follows the so-called Fisher equation according to which a unit increase in in ‡ation should lead to a unit increase in nominal interest rate (thereby in the cost of money holdings) in the long-run. However, empirical estimations suggest that, at least in the short run, a higher growth rate of money decreases the nominal interest. Hence, the present model should be extended to introduce such short-run adjustments.
A Wage Bargaining
From (12) and (15), maximizing the generalized Nash product (18) the …rst order condition gives:
(1 ) (1 + r) (1 + i)
which gives (19) . Moreover, we get: (1 r) V u t With (19) written for period t + 1 and (13), this reduces to:
(1 )
Using again (19) for period t + 1 together with (17) gives 
Multiplying by (1 + i) = (1 ) and rearranging terms gives (20) .
B Equilibrium Dynamics
Deriving (21) at the neighborhood of the steady state t 1 = t = , one gets:
One has @ t 1 =@ t < 1. Since t is a forward-looking variable, its dynamics is locally determinate if and only if @ t 1 =@ t > 1. This happens whenever
Then, the locally unique non-exploding dynamics implies that tightness instantaneously reaches its steady-state value . However this local condition is not su¢ cient to eliminate cycles. Under plausible parameters, condition (32) is satis…ed. To see why, notice that under the Hosios condition = , one has: @ t 1 =@ t = 1 s q = (1 + r). In real worlds, the probability of being employed is higher for a currently employed worker than for a currently unemployed worker. So, 1 s > q , which implies @ t 1 =@ t > 0 > 1.
C Social criteria
From (12), (13) and (15), we get:
(1 + r) t = (1 u t ) y (1 u t ) w t + u t z + T t 1 + i
Using (24) and (5), we get:
Given (26) (1 + r) t = (1 u t ) y + 1
Using (17), (24) and t q ( t ) = t q ( t ) u t ,
(1 + r) t = (1 u t )
Finally, (6) induces (1 + i) p t = (1 + r) p t+1 , so:
which gives (28).
D Optimal allocation
Taking (3) into account, the …rst-order condition of Program (29) is
while the envelope condition writes
These two conditions imply:
(1 + r) q ( t ) = (1 ( t )) y + (1 s ( t ) t q ( t )) 1 ( t ) 1 ( t+1 ) q ( t+1 )
A stationary solution to this recursive equation is implicitly de…ned by:
r + s q ( ) + ( ) = (1 ( )) y which gives (30) directly.
